Resumen El articulo lleva a cabo una reflexión propositiva sobre la concepción y el concepto de violencia contra las mujeres. Su objetivo es reparar en la importancia de reforzar la dimensión de justificación y fundamentación de la categoría y poner el acento en sus elementos basilares e irrenunciables que a su vez pueden constituir propuestas de avance en su interpretación y aplicación. Volver sobre los presupuestos adecuados para superar algunas de las resistencias e incomprensiones que afectan a su teoría y (...) práctica jurídica. Esto es, el carácter político del concepto, los rasgos del sistema de dominación del que se nutre, la coherencia de introducir la tesis de la violencia como continuum, la integración de las respuestas frente a la violencia en el marco de la lucha por la igualdad.Abstract This paper conducts a critical reflection on the conception and the concept of violence against women. Its aim is to recognize the importance of strengthening the scope of justification and grounds of this category, and to emphasize their basilar and unwaiverable elements, which may in turn provide significant proposals for improving its interpretation and application. To return to the appropriate assumptions to overcome some resistances and misunderstandings that affect its theory and legal practice. This is, the political dimension of the notion, the characteristics of the system of domination that inspires it, the consistency of introducing the thesis considering violence as a continuum, the integration of the answers against violence wihtin the framework of the fight for equality. (shrink)

This article seeks to presents the progress in theoretical legal articulation of social rights. It underlines certain guiding ideas about them, sets out some of the most deeply rooted presuppositions and comes to valid conclusions in the field of legality and legitimacy. In the intersection between them there is a double hypothesis under which the text is examined. On one hand, a theory of fundamental rights can integrate social rights; in this sense there are no weighty theoretical reasons that justify (...) a configuration, interpretation and protection differentiating them from other rights, with which in fact they share theoretical and structural elements. On the other hand, given certain conditions, social rights are a reasonable and just response to give a new ground to the social basis of democratic citizenship. (shrink)

JAVIER DE LUCAS, Nosotros que quisimos tanto a Atticus Finch. De las raíces del supremacismo al Black Lives Matter.